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Gender equality is a top priority throughout the world and 
is often considered a basic feature of human rights. Gender 
inequality contributes to a large number of social ills, and 
the evidence is clear that improving gender equality 
improves standard of living, life expectancy, quality of life, 
amongst many other benefits. Improving the quality of 
women’s lives and improving the opportunities available to 
them improves everyone’s life.
Progress towards gender equality has certainly been 
achieved in many societies. But differences persist. Even in 
Scandinavian countries, where many of the structural and 
legal barriers against women have been reduced, we still 
find differences in pay, representation in private business 
boards, as well as the distribution of household and child-
care work/effort.1
Institutionalists suggest that citizens in different socie-
ties should have different preferences based on their expe-
riences in that society. Institutions and history matter, in 
this sense, because they can shape preferences over time 
(Steinmo and Thelen, 1992). We have attempted to disen-
tangle the effects of institutions from other structural and 
social variables by running a simple tax compliance 
experiment in a set of countries: Sweden, UK, Italy and the 
US. In this paper we report the results from what we 
believe to be the largest cross-national tax compliance 
experiment conducted anywhere in the world.
We believe that this design allows us to explore the issue 
of gender behavior and gender differences that is relatively 
unique in both the experimental literature and the field 
of gender studies. Specifically, we are able to examine 
whether the differences between the behavior of men and 
women correspond to the extent of the structural barriers or 
limitations that women face in a given country. It is reason-
able to assume that men’s and women’s behavior converges 
(i.e. men and women will behave in a similar way) in 
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contexts where they are in fact treated more equally than 
they are in countries in which women still face large and 
significant discrimination. Sweden and Italy, for example, 
rank 4 and 16 on the gender inequality index, respectively, 
while the UK and US rank 28 and 43 respectively (Human 
Development Report, 2016).
Precisely because this experiment was conducted in four 
countries with over 1500 participants we are able to look at 
how particular incentives affect individual decisions across 
and within individual countries. Our study examines how 
individuals respond to different types of redistribution, dif-
ferent tax rates, and different tax structures. We are thus 
able to compare how people in different countries, and of 
different genders, respond to these different incentives and 
or disincentives (i.e. variations in the level of redistribu-
tion, tax rates or structure).
Our study was not initially, nor primarily, intended to 
study gender differences in tax compliance. Instead, this 
study was designed to explore how people in different soci-
eties would behave under similar conditions (aka institu-
tions). We wanted to know, quite simply, if people in 
different societies were faced with exactly the same incen-
tives and choices with respect to taxation, would they make 
different decisions? In this paper, however, we report the 
fact that men and women significantly differ in their will-
ingness to comply with their taxes across countries and 
conditions. These differences are remarkably large and are 
consistent across a wide variety of institutional choices. 
Simply put, women appear to be much more tax compliant 
than men in every country and under every condition.
Literature review
There is an extensive body of literature addressing attitudinal 
and political differences between men and women. Virtually 
all of this work confirms that men and women have different 
policy attitudes and preferences. Women tend to be more 
left-leaning and more likely to support state intervention 
through the expansion of the welfare state (Inglehart and 
Norris, 2003; Morgan-Collins, 2013). They are also less 
likely to condone corruption (Barnes and Beaulieu, 2014; 
Dollar et al., 2001; Torgler and Valev, 2010), but less politi-
cally engaged (Atkeson, 2003; Burns et al., 2001; Lawless 
and Fox, 2010; Verba et al., 1997).
It is generally assumed that differences in attitudes will 
translate into difference in behavior. We know, for example, 
that women in the US are more likely to vote than men 
(Centre for American Women and Politics (CAWP), 2015). 
Also women in advanced industrial democracies increas-
ingly tend to vote more to the Left than men (Inglehart and 
Norris, 2000). But, since behavior is structured by the 
social, political, and economic environment, it can be dif-
ficult to determine the extent to which individual behaviors 
are the product of individual preferences or that of socially 
constrained (and constructed) choices. In recent years, 
experimental research has blossomed, partly in order to 
address this issue of identifying the main anchoring point 
of manifested behaviors.
The evidence regarding gender differences, however, is 
somewhat contradictory. Some studies have shown that 
men and women behave differently even when facing 
abstract choices. For example, women tend to be less com-
petitive and less certain of the quality of their performance 
(Preece and Stoddard, 2015). Eckel and Grossman (2001) 
have demonstrated in a variety of experiments that women 
are more altruistic, but others have shown men to be more 
willing to contribute to the public good (1998, 2001, 2008; 
see also Bruner et al., 2017; Brown-Kruse and Hummels, 
1993; Sell and Wilson, 1991; Solow and Kirkwood, 2002).
Men and women also appear to have different attitudes 
and behavior when it comes to taxation specifically. 
Surveys have shown that in contrast to men, women tend to 
think that the tax code is fairer, the likelihood of getting 
caught for evasion is greater, and they overestimate the 
penalties for evasion (Kinsey, 1992; Smith and Stalans, 
1991). In terms of behavior, a number of tax compliance 
experiments have also shown women to be more compliant 
than men (Cadsby et al., 2004; Cadsby et al., 2006; Chung 
and Trivedi, 2003; Gërxhani, 2007; Hasseldine and Hite, 
2002; Kastlunger et al., 2010; Lohse and Qari, 2014; Powell 
and Ansic, 1996; Spicer and Hero, 1985). However, most of 
these studies treat gender as a residual predictor.
We know that behavior is sensitive to context (Chermak 
and Krause, 2002; Seguino et al., 1996). As Sequino et al. 
pointed out, “our environment helps shape how we act and 
how we see others.” And therefore they “suggest that social 
structures that shape our preferences may differ along gen-
der lines” (p.14–15). Even in the lab, behavior is shaped by 
broader social norms. The inconsistent role gender plays in 
many of the existent experiments might be a product of dif-
ferences in the experiments themselves, or a product of the 
differences in the social/political context in which the 
experiments were conducted. Our study attempts to answer 
this issue of contextual or treatment variations that might 
confound gender differences. As such, our study examined 
the gender differences manifested by subjects in the same 
fiscal compliance experiment, across different countries. 
We can therefore further the current research by controlling 
for the potential effects broader social/political contexts 
might bear on behavior.
Experimental overview
Our experiments were conducted at universities during 
the 2013/2014 and 2014/2015 academic years.2 We took 
great care to assure that all subject pools were demo-
graphically very similar and that the selection mecha-
nisms were nearly identical and unbiased (see Tables A1, 
A2, A3, and A4 in the online appendix). Each university 
uses an electronic database to which students, or past 
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students, voluntarily submit their information for partici-
pation in experiments. The participants were then randomly 
selected and invited by email to participate in the experi-
ment (for more details on the Online Recruitment System 
for Economic Experiments (ORSEE), see Greiner, 2004). 
Once the participants arrived at the laboratory they were 
given an anonymized identification number and assigned to 
a partitioned computer to limit the interaction between 
themselves and other participants.3 We linked participant 
pay to ID number thus ensuring complete anonymity.
The experiment consisted of three stages with three 
income reporting rounds within each stage.4 In total, sub-
jects report their income nine times for tax purposes. 
Subjects were given a different experimental parameter with 
each income reporting decision. In the first stage we varied 
the size of the general fund; in stage two we altered the tax 
rates; and in stage three we changed the tax structure. At the 
beginning of each stage, subjects were asked to perform a 
simple clerical task for which they received experimental 
currency (EC) that would be converted into real money at 
the end of the experiment. Subjects were paid 10 experi-
mental currency units (ECU) for each correctly copied line 
of text which was then exchanged for domestic currency at 
the rate of 0.01 per token.
At the beginning of each income reporting round, sub-
jects were given specific examples similar to the decisions 
that they would make in that particular round (see Table 1). 
Specifically, in stage one, the tax rate was 30% of reported 
income, the audit probability was 5%, and we varied the 
amount of redistribution. In round one (Round 1: no redis-
tribution) there was no general fund, and thus no redistribu-
tion. In round two (Round 2: redistribution) the tax revenue 
was placed in a general fund and redistributed equally to all 
participants. For round three (Round 3: redistribution x 2) 
we doubled the general fund and divided it equally amongst 
all subjects. In stage two, the redistribution of the general 
Table 1. Summary of tax reporting rounds.
Stage Task Description
Clerical 1 Earn income that is reported in Rounds 1 through 3
Stage 1 Round 1: No redistribution Flat tax rate of 30% on all reported income
 Tax revenues are not redistributed
 Round 2: Redistribution Flat tax rate of 30% on all reported income
 Tax revenues are collected into a common fund, which is redistributed on an equal 
per capita basis to all participants
 Round 3: Redistribution x 2 Flat tax rate of 30% on all reported income
 Tax revenues are collected into a common fund, the amount in the fund is doubled, 
and then redistributed on an equal per capita basis to all participants
 Clerical 2 Earn income that is reported in Rounds 4 through 6
Stage 2 Round 4: 10% tax rate Flat tax rate of 10% on all reported income
 Tax revenues are collected into a common fund, the amount in the fund is doubled, 
and then redistributed on an equal per capita basis to all participants
 Round 5: 30% tax rate Flat tax rate of 30% on all reported income
 Tax revenues are collected into a common fund, the amount in the fund is doubled, 
and then redistributed on an equal per capita basis to all participants
 Round 6: 50% tax rate Flat tax rate of 50% on all reported income
 Tax revenues are collected into a common fund, the amount in the fund is doubled, 
and then redistributed on an equal per capita basis to all participants
 Clerical 3 Earn income that is reported in Rounds 7 through 9
Stage 3 Round 7: Progressive 1 Top 10% of earners in Clerical 3 pay 50% tax on reported income
 Bottom 10% of earners in Clerical 3 pay 10% tax on reported income
 Everyone else pays 30% tax on reported income
 Tax revenues are collected into a common fund, the amount in the fund is doubled, 
and then redistributed on an equal per capita basis to all participants.
 Round 8: Progressive 2 Participants pay tax of 10% on all reported income under 50 CU
 Participants pay tax of 30% on all reported income between 50 and 100 CU
 Participants pay tax of 50% on all reported income over 100 CU
 Tax revenues are collected into a common fund, the amount in the fund is doubled, 
and then redistributed on an equal per capita basis to all participants
 Round 9: Charity Flat tax rate of 30% on all reported income
 Tax revenues are collected into a common fund, the amount in the fund is doubled, 
and then donated to charity
ECU:experimental currency unit.
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fund remained constant, there was still a 5% chance of 
being audited, but we varied the tax rates in each round. In 
round four (Round 4: 10% tax rate) there was a 10% flat 
tax; for round five (Round 5: 30% tax rate) there was a 30% 
flat tax; and in round six (Round 6: 50% tax rate) there was 
a 50% flat tax. Lastly, in stage three the redistribution and 
audit rate remained constant, while we adjusted the tax 
structure. In round seven (Round 7: progressive 1) the top 
10% of declared incomes payed a 50% tax rate; the bottom 
10% of declared incomes payed a 10% tax rate; and every-
one else payed a 30% rate. In round eight (round 8: progres-
sive 2), all income over 100 ECU was taxed at a 50% rate; 
income between 50 and 100 ECU was taxed at a 30% rate; 
and all income below 50 ECU was taxed at a 10% rate.5
At the end of the tax compliance experiment, partici-
pants were asked to participate in a simple iterated dictator 
game designed by Ryan Murphy and Kurt Ackermann 
(2011) to assess one’s level of prosociality. Once all experi-
ments were complete, we asked the subjects to complete a 
fifteen-minute survey regarding certain demographic and 
attitudinal characteristics.
Altogether there were a total of 1564 subjects: 311 
(Italy), 360 (UK), 566 (US), and 327 (Sweden). In our pool 
50% were female, 38% were employed, and 21% were eco-
nomics majors. The vast majority, 72%, of our subjects had 
participated in experiments before (see Table 2).
Methods and results
Given the literature and common expectations about the 
differences observed between men and women’s behavior 
we draw the hypotheses:
H1: Tax compliance among women will be higher than 
men across rounds.
H2: The differences observed between men and 
women’s responses should be smaller in countries 
that have achieved greater levels of legal and social 
equality.
First, we are interested in whether females comply 
more than males across countries and rounds. Figure 1 
demonstrates prima facie evidence suggesting women are 
more compliant than men across countries. From Figure 2, 
we can observe that there are large gender differences 
across treatments. Although it is not the central compo-
nent of this study, it should be noted, however, that the 
gender gap does vary between decisions. The gender gap 
decreases, for example, when we increase the return on 
the public good. Similarly, the gender gap increases when 
we increase tax rates. In Italy and Sweden, these differ-
ences are mainly being driven by changes in men’s behav-
ior. More specifically, men are more responsive to the 
incentives in each decision in Sweden and Italy, than in 
the US. Moreover, whereas women tend to respond less to 
the experimental treatment in Sweden and Italy, in the UK 
and US women are only slightly less reponsive to the 
treatment. For a more thorough analysis of the effects of 
specific treatments on gender in each country see Bruner 
et al. (2017).
We now examine how gender differences affect tax 
compliance within and across countries. We treat tax report-
ing as a single variable with distinctive values for subject 
and experimental period. We perform a series of Ordinary 
Table 2. Summary statistics.
Variable N Mean SD Min Max
Y (Fraction of reported income 
for each subject in each round)
12,497 0.623 0.432 0 1
Italy 12,512 0.198 0.399 0 1
UK 12,512 0.230 0.421 0 1
US 12,512 0.362 0.481 0 1
Sweden 12,512 0.209 0.407 0 1
Female 12,344 0.496 0.500 0 1
Standardized risk 12,240 −0.004 0.998 −2.171 1.851
Economics major 12,208 0.205 0.404 0 1
Employed 12,328 0.384 0.486 0 1
Past-participation 12,328 0.715 0.451 0 1
Standardized income 12,512 −0.001 0.999 −3.179 5.189
Trust in Government 12,336 −0.001 0.569 −1.67 2.119
Duty to Pay 12,336 0.002 0.584 −2.866 1.222
Pro-redistribution 12,336 −0.006 0.619 −2.719 1.605
SVO angle 12,512 21.964 14.959 −16.260 61.389
Father’s country of birth 12,512 0.566 0.496 0 1
Mother’s country of birth 12,512 0.696 0.460 0 1
SVO: social value orientation.
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Least Squares (OLS) analyses represented by the following 
equation:
OLS Regression
Y female Sweden Sweden
female UK UK fema
ij i i i
i
= + + +
+ +














7 * Θ 
where:
In Table 3 we present the results of our OLS analyses. 
Economics is a dummy variable for economics majors, 
and risk is an individual risk assessment measure. Past-
participation is a dummy variable for whether participants 
have participated in experiments in the past, and employed is 
a variable for whether the subjects are employed. Each of 
these variables was taken from our attitudinal survey, com-
pleted at the end of the experiment. Income (standardized) 
is participants’ income in the first eight rounds. Pro-
redistribution, duty to pay, and trust are factors produced 
from an orthogonal rotated principal components factor anal-
ysis, also from the attitudinal survey (for more details about 
the factor analysis, see Pampel et al., 2017). Pro-redistribution 
is a factor with self-placement on a left-right scale as the key 
component. Duty represents participants’ sense of responsi-
bility to the state, such as the extent to which cheating on 
one’s taxes, cheating on government benefits, and not paying 
taxes for a variety of reasons are justifiable. Trust character-
izes participants’ level of confidence in government. SVO 
angle is measured from an iterated dictator game in which 
one person is asked to allocate their endowment to an 
unknown partner in the room as a test of altruism (for meas-
urement of the SVO see Murphy and Ackerman (2011). 
Native-born mother and father are variables which control 
for the birthplace of the subjects’ parents. Finally, we control 
for each individual reporting round.
In column 1 of Table 3, we estimate the effect of gender 
on tax compliance in our pooled-country dataset with a host 
of control variables. We determine that being female is sta-
tistically significant and positively correlated with tax com-
pliance, generating a large effect. Economics majors, 
past-participation, and risk are all negatively correlated 
with tax compliance, whereas pro-redistribution, duty to 
pay, and SVO are all positive. In columns 2 to 5, we esti-
mate the effect of gender on tax compliance in each indi-
vidual country. The effects of our control variables do 
depend slightly on the country context, but the effect of 
being female is robust in each individual country. We deter-
mine that the effect of being female on tax compliance 
ranges from an 11%increase in the US to a 20% increase in 
Sweden, all else being equal.
Amongst our subjects we find moderate support for the 
idea that women are slightly more risk averse than men, but 
still we find that being female remains highly correlated 
with tax compliance even when controlling for risk accept-
ance, meaning that risk acceptance is not the variable driv-
ing these gender differences. The effect does soften some, 
but maintains a large effect on tax compliance. This result 
is especially important, because it establishes that women 
are profoundly more compliant even when their degree of 
risk acceptance is kept at an identical degree to their male 
cohorts. Confirming previous literature, risk acceptance is 
also negatively correlated with tax compliance. Female 
remains highly significant and positive, holding all else 
constant. In column 6, we are mainly interested in the inter-
action terms to examine the gender tax gap between coun-
tries, with the US as our baseline case. Here the results are 
unexpected: the gender tax gap in the US is significantly 
smaller than in Sweden at the .001 level. The gender tax 
gap is also significantly smaller in the US than in Italy and 
the UK, although the significance is weak.
Finally, in column 7, we examine our full model. 
Economics majors, income, willingness to accept risk, and 
past-participation are all statistically significant. The effect 
of participating in experiments in the past has a large effect, 
decreasing tax compliance by approximately 8% when 
holding all other variables at their mean. Moreover, our 
attitudinal variables such as support for the welfare state 
Figure 1. Average compliance rate by gender.
Yij = the fraction of reported income by each 
participant i in each decision round j
Femalei = dummy variable for female subjects
Swedeni = country dummy for participants who 
participated in the experiment in Sweden
Sweden*femalei = country interaction term for Sweden
UKi = country dummy for participants in the UK
UK*femalei = country interaction term for UK
Italyi = dummy variable for participants in Italy
Italy*femalei = country interaction term for Italy
X = vector of individual characteristics
Eij = individual-specific error term, clustered at 
the individual level
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and duty to pay taxes are also statistically significant. Trust 
in authority is significant, but not in the expected direction. 
This could largely be due to the relatively small variation 
across countries in tax compliance, combined with signifi-
cant variation in trust in government. Swedes, for example, 
demonstrate high trust, whereas Italians demonstrate low 
trust. Furthermore, having native-born parents has no effect 
on our model.6
Against our expectations, we discover that Sweden, a 
country which has achieved one of the highest levels of 
gender equality in the world, demonstrates the largest tax 
compliance gap, and that gap is statistically greater than 
the US, the country with the largest level of gender ine-
quality, according to the gender inequality index.7 In fact, 
Sweden is the only country with a gender gap that is sig-
nificantly larger than the gap in the US. Figure 3 displays 
the predicted probabilities from column 7 of Table 3 for 
the compliance rate by gender in each country. What stands 
out from the figure is the fact that the gender gap is quite 
large in all countries, but especially large in Sweden, the 
UK, and Italy.
Robustness checks
In this section we examine the robustness of our results. 
Specifically, we are concerned with whether our results are 
robust to treatment order. We ran an additional six sessions in 
Figure 2. Average compliance rate by gender.
Stage 1: Variation in the level of redistribution; Stage 2: Variation in the tax rate; Stage 3: Variation in the tax structure. Within each stage there 
were three experimental treatments (see Table 1).
Figure 3. Predicted probabilities for the compliance rate.
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Table 3. Ordinary least squares regression for average compliance rate.
Variables Pooled Italy UK US Sweden Interactions Full Model
Female 0.133*** 0.150*** 0.124*** 0.092*** 0.188*** 0.131*** 0.086***
 (0.016) (0.033) (0.033) (0.027) (0.032) (0.028) (0.027)
Italy 0.031 −0.066* −0.003
 (0.024) (0.034) (0.033)
UK −0.050** −0.208*** −0.077**
 (0.022) (0.033) (0.031)
Sweden −0.006 −0.041 −0.060*
 (0.026) (0.035) (0.034)
Economics major −0.052** −0.050 −0.078** −0.023 −0.027 −0.052**
 (0.021) (0.035) (0.040) (0.047) (0.047) (0.021)
Risk (standardized) −0.045*** −0.034** −0.068*** −0.046*** −0.033* −0.045***
 (0.008) (0.017) (0.018) (0.013) (0.018) (0.008)
Income (standardized) −0.031*** −0.013 −0.065*** −0.021 −0.027 −0.031***
 (0.008) (0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.020) (0.008)
Past-participation −0.077*** −0.039 −0.128*** −0.078*** −0.047 −0.076***
 (0.016) (0.043) (0.037) (0.025) (0.036) (0.016)
Employed 0.007 0.023 0.020 −0.005 −0.013 0.008
 (0.016) (0.041) (0.034) (0.025) (0.030) (0.016)
Pro-redistribution 0.045*** 0.029 0.036 0.015 0.090*** 0.045***
 (0.014) (0.033) (0.032) (0.024) (0.031) (0.014)
Duty to pay 0.070*** 0.115*** 0.078** 0.032 0.077** 0.070***
 (0.015) (0.032) (0.031) (0.025) (0.034) (0.015)
Trust in government −0.044*** −0.062* −0.032 −0.059** −0.043 −0.046***
 (0.015) (0.031) (0.033) (0.027) (0.035) (0.016)
SVO angle 0.007*** 0.006*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.009*** 0.007***
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Father’s birth place 0.002 0.028 −0.034 −0.001 −0.010 −0.001
 (0.022) (0.054) (0.039) (0.041) (0.054) (0.021)
Mother’s birth place −0.015 −0.084 0.008 0.029 −0.058* −0.011
 (0.020) (0.063) (0.037) (0.042) (0.033) (0.020)
Redistribution 0.097*** 0.085*** 0.083*** 0.093*** 0.130*** 0.096*** 0.097***
 (0.010) (0.023) (0.019) (0.017) (0.022) (0.010) (0.010)
Redistribution x 2 0.229*** 0.228*** 0.259*** 0.173*** 0.288*** 0.226*** 0.229***
 (0.011) (0.025) (0.024) (0.018) (0.024) (0.011) (0.011)
10% Tax 0.206*** 0.236*** 0.258*** 0.120*** 0.259*** 0.189*** 0.205***
 (0.012) (0.026) (0.026) (0.021) (0.028) (0.012) (0.012)
30% Tax 0.146*** 0.105*** 0.201*** 0.106*** 0.188*** 0.130*** 0.146***
 (0.011) (0.023) (0.023) (0.018) (0.026) (0.010) (0.011)
50% Tax 0.083*** 0.022 0.169*** 0.046** 0.106*** 0.069*** 0.083***
 (0.012) (0.025) (0.024) (0.020) (0.025) (0.011) (0.012)
Progressive 1 0.114*** 0.037* 0.188*** 0.085*** 0.153*** 0.098*** 0.114***
 (0.011) (0.022) (0.022) (0.019) (0.027) (0.010) (0.011)
Progressive 2 0.120*** 0.082*** 0.176*** 0.069*** 0.179*** 0.103*** 0.120***
 (0.011) (0.023) (0.021) (0.018) (0.025) (0.010) (0.011)
Female * Italy 0.082* 0.049
 (0.045) (0.040)
Female * UK 0.075* 0.062
 (0.045) (0.042)
Female * Sweden 0.116*** 0.107***
 (0.044) (0.040)
Constant 0.355*** 0.420*** 0.337*** 0.393*** 0.247*** 0.486*** 0.379***
 (0.030) (0.070) (0.052) (0.044) (0.061) (0.024) (0.032)
  
N 11849 2352 2760 4172 2565 12129 11849
r2 0.212 0.199 0.243 0.136 0.272 0.104 0.215
SVO: social value orientation.
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.
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Italy varying the treatments. First, we ran a series of differ-
ence in means t-tests in each round to test if there are gender 
differences in compliance in each round for treatment order 
B (see Table 4). The difference in means t-test suggests that 
there are significant differences between men and women in 
each round, with the exception of the 10% tax rate round.
Finally, we estimated an OLS with clustered standard 
errors and dummy variables for rounds 2 through 8 (see 
Table 5). The coefficients for the dummy variables show 
the increase or decrease in compliance relative to the first 
round, which serves as the reference. Indeed, we still 
uncover a large gender gap on average in treatment order B.
Discussion and conclusion
The first and obvious result drawn from this experiment is 
that women behave differently from men in all conditions 
and in all countries studied here. Interestingly, the “gender 
gap” differs greatly between the US and Sweden, and in a 
direction that was completely unexpected when embarking 
on this research. Whereas we expected the gender gap to be 
substantially smaller in more gender egalitarian countries, 
we find instead that gender is a powerful and robust varia-
ble across societies.
Although gender differences in tax compliance have 
been reported in previous articles (see more recently in 
Brockman et al., 2016), these works generally treat gender 
as a residual predictor. The present study demonstrates 
clearly and systematically why this is a major omission: 
gender is strongly associated with an individual’s tax 
behavior, when controlling for institutional, cultural, and 
social factors. Our experiments show substantial gender 
variation in tax compliance across the four countries, given 
varying levels of social and legal gender equality.
Indeed, the original assumption that gender differences 
should be substantially minimized in more gender neutral 
societies assumed a temporal connection between norms, 
institutions and behavior that may be unrealistic. Norms are 
Table 4. Difference in means t-test for gender by round in treatment order B.







Stage 1 −3.46*** −3.073*** −2.839***
 Male (54) 0.6 0.63 0.549
 Female (66) 0.833 0.83 0.746
 Gender 50% Tax T 30% Tax T 10% Tax Means test
Stage 2 Male 0.61 −4.226*** 0.655 −3.125*** 0.747 −1.540
 Female .87 0.848 0.843
 Gender Progressive 1 T Progressive 2 T Charity Means test
Stage 3 Male 0.657 −2.553*** 0.7 −2.618*** 0.616 −4.388***
 Female 0.84 0.86 0.892
Notes: The t-test for equal is reported in the third, fifth, and seventh column with statistical significance indicated by asterisks: *** indicates the dif-
ference is significant at the 1% level.
















Duty to pay −0.050
 (0.042)




















Robust standard errors in parentheses.
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.
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sticky. This, we believe, can help explain why what Preece 
calls “gendered psyches” continue to have strong effects on 
behavior that may not correspond immediately to recently 
effected institutional changes. As Inglehart and Norris 
(2003: 79) noted “structural developments lead to, and 
interact with, cultural shifts that tend to reshape political 
values.” Thus, we should not be so surprised to see that 
behavioral change lags behind the institutional change.
Our findings thus call into question the liberal assump-
tion that given equal conditions, individuals behave in the 
same ways. Instead, our research demonstrates, even where 
structural reforms have actively targeted and effectively 
reduced legal and formal gender gaps, the behavioral dif-
ferences between males and females persist. We find only 
weak evidence of intrinsic behavioral differences, such as 
attitudes towards risk, and as such our study strengthens the 
argument on variation in gendered perceptions (Fox and 
Lawless, 2011; Lawless and Fox, 2010.
In sum, our study uncovers significant gender variation 
in tax compliance across tax conditions and countries. 
Furthermore, this study makes the claim that albeit more 
social and legal gender equality, large behavioral differ-
ences between genders still persist – even in Sweden. The 
results do leave room for alternative interpretations and 
require further study. We welcome and encourage scholars 
to utilize our data in combination with other studies to fur-
ther our understanding of these behavioral differences.
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Notes
1. The World Economic Forum Global Gender Gap rankings 
place the Nordic countries as some of the most gender equal 
countries in the world (Hausmann et al., 2009).
2. The experimental sites included Bologna Laboratory 
for Experiments in Social Sciences, Centro d’Economia 
Sperimentale A Roma Est, and Experimental Economics Lab of 
the University of Milano Bicocca in Italy; Oxford Experimental 
Laboratory, Experimental Economics Laboratory–Royal 
Holloway in London, Finance and Economics Experimental 
Laboratory at Exeter, and ESSEXLab at Essex in the UK; 
Learning and Experimental Economics Projects at University 
of California–Santa Cruz, Social Science Experiments Lab at 
University of Colorado–Boulder, Appalachian Experimental 
Economics Laboratory in Boone, North Carolina, Center for 
Behavioral Political Economy in Stony Brook, New York, 
University of Hawaii Laboratory for Computer-Mediated 
Experiments and the Study of Culture in Honolulu, Hawaii, in 
the US; the Behavioural Lab in Stockholm and Behavioural 
and Experimental Economics in Gothenburg, Sweden.
3. The experiments were conducted in z-tree and a newer 
web-based experimental software called Bahavery (see 
Fischbacher, 2007).
4. For the purpose of this study, we chose to use only the first 
eight rounds of the experiments.
5. Round 9 was a charity round in which all tax revenue is 
donated to a specific charity. We have chosen not to include 
round 9 in the analysis, because it is not necessarily tax, but 
rather a donation. However, we did run preliminary analysis 
including the charity round, and it does not affect our results.
6. We ran three robustness tests on these data. We examined the 
intensity of evasion by gender using an ordered probit model on 
a variable which represents those that report 100%, a variable 
which measures those who evaded 100%, and another which 
represents those who report something in between. We also 
ran the above models in each individual round. First, men tend 
to cheat 100% significantly more than women, and women are 
100% compliant significantly more than men. Furthermore, 
women are more likely to cheat in small amounts. We also 
ran the above model in each individual round, with very little 
change in the overall results. Finally, we ran our full model for 
only the first round of the data to eliminate any confound from 
potential learning/order effects. The main results still hold if 
we run the model for only round 1.
7. A Wald test confirms that the gender gaps between the U.K., 
Sweden, and Italy are insignificant.
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